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Abstract
Today’ s simultaneous trends of “globalization” and “regionalization” paradoxically inten-
sify nationalistic confl ict in Northeast Asia, especially over history issues. After the division of 
the region into nation-states under the Cold War system, each nation developed its own version 
of national history. In the context of globalization, information fl ows between these nations with 
ever-greater speed, which gives rise to the possibility of both dialogue and controversy. The issue 
of history is a factor of instability in Northeast Asia, especially between Japan, Korea and China. 
Mutual distrust is deeply rooted in memories of war and imperialism. This paper takes up the 
“history problem” in contemporary Northeast Asia. It does not try to set straight “what actually 
happened” in the past, but considers why this history problem remains unresolved, and why it ap-
pears as a clash between nationalisms.
The memories of the past war constitute contemporary national identities, but the treatment 
of these memories has a specifi c history. The article considers how in the immediate postwar 
global order, defi ned by the Cold War, Japan substituted war reparations with alternative forms 
of economic assistance that avoided a resolution of the history issue with Korea and China, and 
how that frozen set of relations in Asia thawed as the global order shifted again after 1989. While 
inter-government talks have sought to construct friendly relationships with future-oriented strate-
gies, some conservative politicians – particularly in Japan – have tried to increase national inte-
gration by emphasizing patriotic school curricula. This tendency has resulted in history textbook 
controversies within Japan and between Japan and its neighbors, which also give rise to the need 
for transnational dialogue. The controversies, through refl ecting on knowledge of the past – or 
pasts – , hint at the future actions that must be taken to commence historical reconciliation and 
community building in Northeast Asia.
1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, relations between Northeast Asian countries have been deepening rapidly, 
while nationalistic clashes between them have also intensifi ed. In particular, the “history prob-
lem” related to the region’ s tumultuous twentieth century has become one of the most serious 
obstacles to the building of intimate diplomatic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. Al-
though some dismiss the past as meaningless or harmful for the future of an Asian community, 
without addressing the causes of deeply rooted mutual distrust the formation of a regional com-
munity remains diffi cult, if not impossible. Moreover, how and what kind of past is recognized 
determines what kind of future will be constructed. Northeast Asian countries have a history 
characterized not only by confl icts, but also by interdependence. The history of the Second World 
War in Asia is often projected onto the present and the problems of the present are often project-
ed onto the past. Understanding the differences and controversies of historical recognition helps 
us to understand the problems of contemporary politics and to envisage a better future that would 
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overcome past confl icts.
The purpose of this article is not only to reveal the confl icting issues and differences in his-
torical recognition, which might merely reproduce racial prejudice as well as mutual distrust, but 
also to examine the background in which clashing nationalisms originated. This background in-
cludes the rise of the modern nation-state, the history of Japanese imperialism, the postwar Cold 
War system and its collapse, as well as subsequent processes of regionalization under the infl u-
ence of globalization. The memories of physical and mental pain must be remembered so they 
will not be reproduced. Postwar compensation cannot heal this pain, but it could contribute to the 
building of justice of rule in the public sphere, and to learning from past crimes. The answer to 
the question of the history problem requires a stop to the chain of hatred that stems from histori-
cal confl icts, and depends upon constructive approaches to reconciliation. In addition, this article 
suggests that the historical controversies can lead to a mutual understanding of differences and 
ultimately a more open public arena in which more people may have the freedom to participate.
Therefore, this article provides an overview of the differences in historical recognition in the 
region in order to more clearly consider the factors underlying the controversies and the issues 
to address. It will discuss the differences among nations using the opinions of intellectuals and 
the public found in recent survey data. First, it will put the contemporary history problem in the 
historical context of Northeast Asia and review the way in which the Japanese government dealt 
with war reparation under the Cold War system. It will then show how this relates to the general 
view of history in postwar Japan, and consider the infl uence of history education on public opin-
ions in reference to the history textbook controversies between Japan and its neighbors. After 
discussing the differences and controversies in historiography which led to clashing nationalisms 
as well as attempts at dialogue among Northeast Asian countries, the study will explore the pos-
sibility of historical reconciliation and community building in Northeast Asia.
Modern Northeast Asia was shaped by the expansion of empire, colonization, aggressive 
war, and the resistance against it. “Northeast Asia” in this study includes the People’ s Republic 
of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Democratic 
People’ s Republic of Korea (North Korea), and Japan. Because the information on Taiwan and 
North Korea is limited in Japan, and because China, South Korea, and Japan are most involved 
in the problem arising from confl icting national histories, this analysis will focus on Japanese at-
titudes toward the history problem and on interactions between Japan and China, and Japan and 
South Korea, using joint opinion polls such as the Asia-Vision Survey on college students’ at-
titudes conducted by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) of the Waseda 
University Global COE Program in 2009, the joint opinion polls involving China, South Korea 
and Japan conducted by Asahi Shimbun in 2005, and the Japan-China joint opinion polls con-
ducted by the Genron NPO during the years 2005-2007.
The subject of the history problem is the nation. This study uses the defi nition of the na-
tion as outlined by Ernest Renan, the famous nationalist and philosopher. In the late nineteenth 
century, he described the nation as a modern project based on a select memory of the past. He 
belonged to the fi rst generation of the nation-state system, and explored the emergence of the 
early nation-state in France. He answered the question “What is a Nation?” in his lecture at the 
Sorbonne in 1882 as follows:
A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifi ces that 
one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presup-
poses a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, 
the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. 1?
According to Renan, a nation is built of the solidarity between a group of people who con-
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sent to forget past confl icts within the nation in-group and share a sense of mutual past suffering, 
a desire for present lives lived in common, and for a common future destiny. A nation is based on 
a “daily plebiscite.”
Northeast Asian people now share the past within the units of separate nations, which makes 
the present history problem appear as a clash between nationalisms. The past that forms their 
common identity is constructed and reconstructed for a future, large-scale solidarity. If the past 
could be shared among Northeast Asian people, on an even larger scale, it would then be possible 
to envision constructing a greater regional community.
2. The “History Problem”
As transnational relations have developed with the expansion of the global market since the 
collapse of the Cold War system, confl icts between nations have intensifi ed. The infl uence of the 
processes of “globalization,” economic openness, and cultural exchange has gradually increased 
among Northeast Asian countries, and the history problem has also became an important issue 
and factor of instability in the region. Of course, history problems are universal issues, rooted in 
struggles for human rights against violence and discrimination, originating in state power espe-
cially during times of war. Today’ s accusations of the Japanese state, attributing to it various war 
crimes, such as the exploitation of “[war] comfort women” 2 and forced labor during the Second 
World War, are also based on universal ideas of “crime against peace” and “crime against human-
ity.” This humanitarian movement is a consequence of democratization in Northeast Asian coun-
tries.
At the same time, the reason why the contemporary history problem in Northeast Asia ap-
pears as a clash of nationalisms is that this region has long been divided. First, nations in the 
region were separated into empires and colonies, and later into nation-states under the postwar 
East-West division of the world. These divisions have inhibited reconciliation up to the present 
day.
After the end of Japanese colonial rule and war of aggression, both Korea and China, as 
countries emerging from a colonial past, adopted an orthodox ideology of national history based 
on their peoples’ resistance to Japanese imperialism and the subsequent achievement of indepen-
dence through these struggles. Japan had indoctrinated its imperial subjects in the period lead-
ing up to and during the war with imperial history centered on the ancient myth of the Emperor, 
which justifi ed Japanese imperial rule as the extension of the Emperor system. In the postwar 
period, national history was reconstructed to be consistent with universal values of modernity, 
democracy, and pacifi sm. This reshaping was an attempt to reject what was seen as the premod-
ern, underdeveloped social structure of Japan that had led to militarism. 3 The typical case of this 
national postwar pacifi sm is the remembrance of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki in 1945, in which Japanese citizens suffered as victims. The postwar goal of pacifi sm was 
achieved by stressing defeat, and was politically secured by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security between the United States and Japan under the Cold War system. Under this treaty 
the American military presence both protected Japan and controlled Japanese military activity, 
functioning as a stabilizer in the region. Japanese people memorialized their sufferings, as well 
as the wartime poverty and the pervasive culture of violence perpetrated in Japan, through indi-
vidual Japanese citizens who were seen as “unpatriotic” (???), members of the military, local 
communities, and schools. The postwar emphasis on their own experience inside Japan effaced 
any consciousness of the aggression other Asian countries had experienced at the hand of Japan.
Hence many Japanese people cannot understand why neighboring countries still actively 
blame Japan, even after agreements on war reparation were concluded and feelings of remorse 
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were expressed several times at the government level. Some people simplistically ascribe anti-Ja-
pan movements in Korea and China to excessive “national sentiments” (????), which would 
be ingrained by dictatorships through state-imposed curricula of self-centered national history.
For example, according to the Asia-Vision Survey, 4 20% of Japanese college students think 
“the biggest obstacles to the development of Asian countries’ relationships” is “differences of 
historical recognition,” and 19% think it is “national sentiments,” rather than economic, social, or 
cultural differences (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Views on Obstacles to the Development of Asian Countries’ Relationships
Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.
To counter this trend in popular sentiment, Japan-China and Japan-South Korea joint his-
tory research groups have been trying to fi nd the objective “facts” in order to make up for the 
discrepancies in historical recognition and to promote reconciliation through “sober” intellectual 
dialogue. 5 For example, the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee was launched after 
anti-Japan demonstrations occurred in China in 2005, and an agreement on joint history research 
by both Japanese and Chinese intellectuals was reached at the subsequent Japan-China Summit 
Meeting in 2006.
The chairman of the Japanese side of the Committee, Shin’ ichi Kitaoka, on the mission of 
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the research, said, “The history problem must be separated from politics. If the history problem 
arises, its discussion should be left to scholars while political economic partnerships shouldn’ t 
retrograde.” 6 Kitaoka is also a policy member of the Japan-ROK (South Korea) Joint History Re-
search Committee.
In spite of this goal of “mitigating confl icting sentiments over the history problem, and the 
attempts at increasing exchange and peaceful partnership between the two countries by reveal-
ing historical facts and interchanging opinions on the historical recognitions through researchers’ 
sober studies,” 7 the 2010 report of the Japan-China Joint History Research resulted not in a joint 
statement but in a disjointed report. Unable to agree on the number of victims in the Nanking 
Massacre, for example, the report recorded both Chinese estimates (more than 300,000) and 
those of the Japanese (20,000-200,000), even though the Japanese side acknowledged that Japan 
was responsible for this atrocity. This lingering discrepancy in the area of quantitative knowledge 
is a reminder that “facts” are not neutral.
Of course historical records have their limitations. At the end of the war, many offi cial docu-
ments were burned. Oral history is also limited, since few people concerned are still alive today. 
In the contemporary situation, the issue is no longer that the generation with wartime experience 
won’ t speak out, but that those with no personal experience are grappling with historical recogni-
tion. Apart from non-political, pure “objective” matters of historiography, another factor of cog-
nitive differences relating to politics should be considered here. Immanuel Wallerstein explains 
politics of “pastness” as follows:
Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they might 
not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is a central 
element in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness therefore is pre-
eminently a moral phenomenon, therefore a political phenomenon, always a contemporary 
phenomenon…Since the real world is constantly changing…Ergo, the content of pastness 
necessarily constantly changes. 8
In postwar Northeast Asia, authoritarian governments, including the Japanese government 
under the LDP’ s dominance, 9were also seen as a kind of authoritarianism–exploited memories 
of the dark past to legitimate their own rule. These governments, under the auspices of the Cold 
War policies of the United States, promised their citizens modernization, focusing on economic 
growth rather than on democratic participation. Real democratic participation was replaced by 
economic nationalism, which boasted economic growth and granted the people economic income 
and social welfare in exchange for a voice in policy.
3. The Process of War Reparation
Japan’ s approach to war reparation from immediately postwar until recently was strongly 
determined by the Cold War system under which the history problem was frozen. With the col-
lapse of the bipolar system, this problem began to thaw, resulting in the current confl icts. Under 
the Cold War, open dialogue between Japan and its neighboring countries was not permitted, but 
post-1989, dialogue has been possible and has led to both confl ict and the possibility of reconcili-
ation. Understanding this postwar political situation helps us understand the persistence of the 
wartime history problem.
The outbreak of the Korean War just five years after the conclusion of WWII turned the 
Cold War in East Asia into hot war. In the context of United States strategy at the time, Japan 
needed to be the “bulwark against communism” in the region. Allied Forces occupying Japan 
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in the immediate postwar years shifted from an emphasis on democratization to a policy of re-
armament and economic independence. This “reverse course” resulted in a Japanese version of 
McCarthyism–a “red purge” of Communist Party offi cials from public offi ce–and the release of 
previously purged war criminals, militarists, and ultra-nationalists. To facilitate the incorporation 
of Japan into the Western Bloc, the priority of Western countries–led by the U.S.–was Japan’ s 
economic recovery, at the expense of working through war reparations. 10
The Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida dismissed demands from 
those on the Left to sign an overall peace treaty with all of the countries in Asia, including Com-
munist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The terms of the treaty would have given 
Japan sovereignty, “territorial integrity” and reduced its responsibility for making war reparations 
to facilitate Japan’ s economic recovery. Instead Yoshida favored a treaty of mutual cooperation 
between the U.S. and Japan, which guaranteed a signifi cant American military presence in Japan, 
and therefore in East Asia. This military presence, together with the subsequently established 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces, was ostensibly to safeguard Japan’ s “unarmed peace,” and placed 
Japan fi rmly in the Western Bloc.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan were signed by 48 
nations in 1951, and American Cold War strategy exempted Japan from most reparation responsi-
bilities. Allied countries that had been attacked or occupied by Japan–Laos, Cambodia, Australia, 
the Netherlands (the metropole of Indonesia), the U.K. (Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia), 
and the U.S. (the mandatory of Micronesia)–renounced the right to claim war reparations. How-
ever, some Asian governments that had been colonial subjects and former colonies of Imperial 
Japan–North Korea, South Korea and the Republic of China (the present Taiwan)–were excluded 
from these discussions. The People’ s Republic of China, India, Burma (the present Myanmar), 
Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (the present Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) were also absent. After this, however, India, the Republic of China, and the People’ s 
Republic of China renounced their claim for war reparations by signing bilateral treaties with 
Japan in 1952. The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the 
People’ s Republic of China was also subsequently signed in 1972, invalidating the former Sino-
Japanese Peace Treaty. Instead of war reparations, Japan extended Chinese support for economic 
development. The Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) was a form of reparations from Japan 
to China, but Japan did not compensate for the suffering of war victims in China.
Japan compensated through bilateral agreements based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 
the case of the Philippines, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam, Burma, and Indonesia. For countries that had renounced any claim for reparation–Laos, 
Cambodia, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia and Micronesia–Japan also concluded a bilateral treaty 
of economic cooperation. The grants and soft loans Japan provided to honor these treaties went 
under the name of economic assistance rather than war reparation. With regards to Thailand, 
Mongolia and European countries, Japan concluded agreements addressing rights to claim war 
reparation and provided economic assistance as postwar compensation.
All of these promises to Japan’ s neighbors were made in the Cold War atmosphere that 
descended upon East Asia at the conclusion of WWII. In this global situation, the Allied Pow-
ers were particularly concerned with reinvigorating Japan’ s economic standing to create a solid 
capitalist ally in East Asia. Most of the reparations, then, became conditional loans, which func-
tioned to assist Japan’ s economic advancement. The expansion of Japan’ s economy into South-
east Asia evoked the spread of prewar and wartime Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, these 
postwar strategies were largely planned and implemented by the very same economic bureaucrats 
and company managers who had served Imperial Japan, and many feared it was a revival of the 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” 11 Progressive intellectuals in Japan often criticized, 
and some of them continue to criticize, this character of Japan’ s compensation.
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In the case of South Korea, which had a particularly fraught postcolonial relationship with 
Japan, Japan concluded a treaty in 1965 to provide grants and soft loans as compensation for its 
35-year imperial rule of the Korean Peninsula. This “compensation,” however, addressed post-
war economic development in South Korea, but not the misery of those who were victims of 
war under Japanese colonial rule. Both Japanese and South Korean governments put economic 
development before the resolution of their shared history problem. Because of this neglect, his-
torical controversies between the two nations, such as that over the legality of the Japan-Korea 
Annexation Treaty of 1910, continue. Also, although there was an offi cial recognition by the Jap-
anese government of legal responsibility for war reparation based on the 1965 treaty, 12 the issue 
of compensation for individual victims such as forced laborers and “comfort women” remains 
unresolved. Because the victims were forced into silence by the developmental dictatorship in 
postwar South Korea, only more recently–since the process of democratization began in the late 
1980s–have they begun to dare accusing the Japanese state of war crimes. Only in the 1990s, af-
ter the demise of the “1955 system” 13 and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’ s long-time rule in 
Japan did the Japanese government begin to respond to these concerns.
In the course of the geopolitical transformation from the Cold War division of Eastern and 
Western Bloc to a cross-border market system with gradual liberalization and multi-polarization, 
international relations in Northeast Asia have become very close. In response to this trend, at-
tempts have appeared to move history education beyond national history and to embrace a trans-
national perspective. In Japan, and to some extent in China, these efforts have influenced the 
writing of history textbooks.
Diplomatic talks between nations in Northeast Asia tend to avoid history issues and attempt 
instead to strengthen partnerships with future-oriented strategies. 14 To this end, Northeast Asian 
governments try to promote economic and cultural relations. Included in these efforts is the pro-
motion of apolitical joint history research among two or three nations. Many intellectuals respond 
to this trend, and strive toward sharing universal ideas in the global system. 15 For example, the 
project “Japan-China Intellectual Community” was launched to promote cross-border intellectual 
exchanges during 1997-2003. 16 Chinese historian Liu Jie points out that from the 1990s “multipo-
larization of history studies” has developed in China, making free research possible and contrib-
uting to diversifi cation of the views of history, not necessarily subject to state power. According 
to Liu Jie the project refl ected these trends and was set up as a non-offi cial attempt to construct a 
common space where “public intellectuals” in East Asia could exchange their opinions freely and 
think beyond national borders. 17
In general, however, the more globalized knowledge and power are, the wider the gaps 
between the intellectual elite and the common people. School education plays a central role in 
shaping people’ s worldviews, and the history of prewar Asia also demonstrates that the budding 
cosmopolitanism of the elite stood in stark contrast to the nationalism of the masses. When the 
social tensions caused by this gap increase, it can intensify anti-foreign nationalism and chauvin-
ism in society at large. This case shows that nationalistic resentment can be an unintended result 
of patriotic national education.
In recent years, Japanese educational trends exhibit this push toward patriotism. For ex-
ample, the 1999 Law Regarding the National Flag and Anthem can be seen as an index of neo-
conservative nationalism, since it revives the prewar practice of displaying the national fl ag and 
playing the national anthem, even though students are not forced to salute the fl ag or sing the 
anthem. Japan’ s national fl ag and anthem were symbols of the rule of the Empire of Japan. These 
symbols revive the memories of Japan’ s war of aggression and its colonial rule, and make neigh-
boring Asian people nervous that Japan may return to prewar militarism, or that there may be a 
revival of the sense of racial superiority that was prevalent during that period. Even at sporting 
events, such as the 2004 AFC Asian Cup held in China, the sight of Japanese supporters singing 
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the national anthem and fl ying the national fl ag has the potential to evoke sensitivity and hostil-
ity in many neighboring Asians. Also, the infl uence of mass media on popular sentiment cannot 
be ignored. The deeply rooted memories of the past war are susceptible to breaking out when 
prompted by sensational mass media coverage. 18
The recent rise of neo-nationalism as a reaction against globalization and social unrest in-
dicates domestic society and national integration in crisis in Japan, South Korea, and China. In 
Japan, the Fundamental Law of Education was amended in 2006 for the fi rst time since its estab-
lishment in 1947. It adds as the objective of education "to nurture an attitude...to love our coun-
try and our home," which is known as the “Patriotism Clause.” 19 Seemingly anachronistic, this 
move is a reaction within Japan to the globalization of history studies, and a response to Korean 
and Chinese voices criticizing Japanese wartime policy. Education in all three nations becomes a 
battlefi eld, in which nothing less than national identity is at stake. According to the results of the 
Asia-Vision Survey, more than half of Japanese college students get their knowledge about other 
Asian countries from their school education (see Figure 2). Therefore, the next section takes into 
account how school education infl uences people’ s understanding of history in Japan, as well as 
in South Korea and China.
Figure 2: Main Sources of Knowledge about Other Asian Countries
Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.
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4. History Education and Politics
Louis Althusser, examining ideology, determined the school as one of the fundamental ideo-
logical state apparatuses to reproduce a capitalist social system. 20 Ernest Gellner analyzes the na-
tion-state as a prerequisite for the establishment of the capitalist system, which demands homo-
geneous labor power cultivated by the state’ s general education. 21 School education, especially 
the knowledge of history, is the basic common knowledge meant to produce and reproduce a na-
tion. National integration is also a precondition for the free functioning of global markets. These 
simultaneous trends toward national integration and international interactions raise the possibility 
of nationalistic clashes. The confl icts between national histories among Northeast Asian countries 
show this dynamic. In this region, national memories about the war linger, and are infl uenced by 
views that emphasize self-victimization.
In Northeast Asia, Japanese history textbooks have caught the public’ s attention. School ed-
ucation is often used as a political tool, wielded to construct and reconstruct national identity. As 
such, the Japanese history textbook controversy is suitable to serve as a case to understand these 
contemporary identity politics.
The Japanese constitution guarantees academic freedom. Every scholar enjoys the right to 
research independent of state power, and universities ostensibly remain autonomous. School-
teachers can also teach students with their own supplemental teaching materials under the prin-
ciple of the local self-government. 22 The primary textbook, however, must be authorized by the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. This so-called textbook authori-
zation system is virtually state censorship.
The contents of these offi cial history textbooks, authorized by a government ministry, are 
assumed to correspond to offi cial statements made in the international context. One expects them 
to be created with respect paid especially to Japan’ s neighboring countries, and their relationship 
to Japanese imperial history. When the Ministry of Education demanded a rewrite of the term 
used for the Japanese Army’ s incursion in Northern China from “invaded” (??) to “advanced 
into” (??), Japanese history textbooks became a diplomatic issue. After receiving the Chinese 
government’ s protest against this edit, the Ministry of Education adopted a new authorization 
criterion, the so-called “Neighboring Country Clause.” It declared, “Textbooks ought to show un-
derstanding and seek international harmony in their treatment of modern and contemporary his-
torical events involving neighboring Asian countries.” By virtue of this clause and to respond to 
the anti-Japan demonstrations in South Korea in 1992 sparked by the testimony of former Korean 
“comfort women,” a description of “(war) comfort women” appeared in most history textbooks.
The “comfort women” issue manifested itself as Korean nationalism, but it also raised trans-
national concerns voiced by the United Nations Commissions of Human Rights (UNCHR) and 
various civic groups. The Japanese government was forced to apologize and disclose the results 
of their investigations into the alleged, coercive mobilization of Asian women as “comfort wom-
en,” or prostitutes for Japanese soldiers during the war years. Finally Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Yohei Kono acknowledged the facts about the coercion and wretched living conditions of “comfort 
women,” and the army’ s involvement in this system. He issued an apology in 1993. 23
On the fi ftieth anniversary of the war’ s end, Prime Minister Tomi’ ichi Murayama issued a 
statement in which he expressed “feelings of deep remorse” and “a heartfelt apology” for Japa-
nese “colonial rule and aggression.” 24 This declaration set a precedent, which has been followed 
by successive cabinets whenever the history problem comes up and Japan’ s relations with neigh-
boring South Korea and China deteriorate.
In a sense, the statement is a product of democratization. With the collapse of the longtime 
LDP-controlled regime, Murayama–the head of the Japan Socialist Party–formed a coalition 
cabinet in 1994. The Japan Socialist Party, which subsequently changed its name to the Social 
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Democratic Party, had adopted policies designed for the protection of the postwar constitution, 
pacifism, and opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Therefore, the political rise of the 
Japan Socialist Party meant an increased diplomatic effort to enhance peaceful relations with 
Northeast Asian countries, especially with China. Although the Japanese political left is assumed 
to be “progressive,” it also retains a “conservative” element: its policy of protecting the Constitu-
tion, which remains the ideal manifestation of “emancipation” from a dark past of the oppression 
of individual freedom. 25 The postwar constitution of Japan signifi es the negation of the past of 
militarism, imperialism, and “fascism”–even if the terms used to describe Japan’ s war crimes re-
fer to militarism rather than a political system of fascism 26–and expresses the will of the Japanese 
people to construct a free and peaceful society in the future by overcoming the past.
History is refl exive knowledge that enables us to imagine the future as a process of “progress” 
or “recession.” 27 What kind of past we try to address decides what kind of future we can build. 
The approaches to issues of war responsibility among Northeast Asian countries are not only 
“diplomatic cards” used to extend friendship or apply pressure but also to signal the direction in 
which the countries may progress cooperatively. Having suffered from Japan’ s imperialism, oth-
er Northeast Asian countries retain a deep mistrust of Japan. Therefore they continue to demand 
sincere remorse and apology, especially in light of the various reactionary movements that also 
continue to rise in Japan.
According to the opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in response to anti-Japanese 
protests in China in 2005, nearly half of Chinese (48%) and South Koreans (43%) thought that 
Japan’ s apology was the most effective means to resolve the history problem. Japanese people, 
however, thought it would be exchange–cultural, economic, and political–(29%) rather than apol-
ogy (13%) (see Figure 3). Japanese people might wish to forget the loathsome wartime past. This 
seems to be a factor of difference and an obstacle to coming to a mutual recognition of history. 
Postwar generations seem to have little consciousness about history, and therefore little sense of 
responsibility for the past and for how it might infl uence the future. This is quasi-realism: they 
see only the very transient present, but cannot actually contemplate the future and its relation to 
the past.
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Figure 3: Views on the Most Effective Way to Resolve the History Problem
Source: Asahi Shimbun, April 27, 2005.
Contrary to the general image this constructs, however, Japanese youth are not necessarily 
indifferent when it comes to the history problem. According to the results of the Asia-Vision Sur-
vey in 2009, about 80% of Japanese college students do care about this issue (see Figure 4).
According to the results of a three-year survey (2005-2007) conducted by the Genron NPO 
in China and Japan on the question of whether the history problem could be resolved by deepen-
ing relations between the two nations, we see that Japanese were more pessimistic than Chinese 
(only about 26% of Japanese respondents in 2005, 27% in 2006 and 30% in 2007 thought that 
resolution was possible). In contrast, Chinese people seemed signifi cantly more optimistic for 
the future (about 51%, 50% and 52% respectively). In Japan, a signifi cant group of respondents 
indicated that even if relations deepened, the history problem would not be resolved (about 30%, 
36% and 33% of Japanese, compared with about 11%, 14% and 23% of Chinese in the three 
years respectively), but that at least, the bilateral relations could not deepen without the resolu-
tion of the history problem (about 23%, 22%, 22% of Japanese, compared with about 26%, 32%, 
20% of Chinese) (see Figure 5). Even after the anti-Japanese protests intensified in China in 
2005, these tendencies changed very little.
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Figure 4: The Importance of the History Problem
Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.
These opinions infl uence the Japanese government’ s attempts at resolving the history prob-
lem and develop friendly relations with the neighboring countries. Several differences remain, 
however, between the various levels of government and public opinion. Intellectuals both within 
and without Japan also have their own assessments.
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Figure 5. Views on Japan-China Relations and the History Problem
Source: Created by author from data in Genron NPO, The 3rd Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll in 2007.
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5. Historiography and Controversies over the Recognition of History
The Murayama government, in addition to a general apology, specifi cally addressed the is-
sue of “comfort women” and supported the foundation of the Asian Women’ s Fund. This fund 
collected private funds from Japanese people and donated it as “money of compensation” (??
?) to former “comfort women” in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, etc. from 1995-2007.
Some women’ s human rights groups, the Korean government and the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights criticized the fund for its “private nature.” They alleged that the “com-
fort women” system was a war crime and a “crime against humanity” and the Japanese govern-
ment should accept its legal responsibility and apologize for it by providing state compensation 
for the victims and also by promoting education about the issue in Japan. 28 This criticism was re-
fl ected in the refusal by some former “comfort women” to accept the “money of compensation.” 
On the side of Japan, there were some reasons why the Japanese government avoided taking le-
gal responsibility for the issue. If the Japanese government had accepted legal responsibility, the 
government would have had to extend the same treatment to other individuals who might have 
claims against the government, such as Japanese orphans who were left behind in China when 
Japan withdrew from China in the waning days of the war, and Japanese prisoners of war in the 
Soviet Union, who were forced to do hard labor in Siberia, many of them even long after Japan’ s 
surrender and many also dying while in incarceration. Therefore, before examining whether the 
Japanese army and government had coerced women to work in “comfort stations,” and before ac-
knowledging this activity as a crime, the Japanese government tried to resolve the issue through 
private “money of compensation.” Paradoxically, this action prompted attacks by both rightwing 
nationalists in Japan who denied Japan’ s war responsibility and by leftwing liberals who criti-
cized the “private” nature of the fund. 29
With the rise of reactionary movements led by nationalist politicians of the right-wing LDP 
after Murayama’ s statement in 1995, policy on this issue began to shift. In connection with a 
group dedicated to reforming Japanese textbooks, they attacked the “masochistic view of his-
tory” that saw Japan as an evil aggressive state, and criticized what they saw as “servile” apology 
diplomacy in the postwar era. According to their argument, the historical records were seen as 
inadequate to prove that the Japanese army forced women in colonies to work as sex slaves. 30 As 
a result, the description of this issue disappeared from Japanese history textbooks in 2000.
This dramatic elimination of the “comfort women” issue from textbooks due to a lack of 
written historical records exemplifi es how positivist claims about the lack of “evidence” have 
been used by revisionist historians to assert that the admission of Japanese responsibility in the 
comfort women issue is not based on “historical facts.”  Reactionary politicians who wish to 
deny or reject any claims of Japanese responsibility have fully exploited the positivism among 
these historians.
The group responsible for this move, The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, 
was formed in 1996 by scholars gathering around the title “The Association for Advancement of 
an Unbiased View of History.” Its textbook, the New History Textbook, was approved by the Min-
istry of Education in 2001, and was used by only 0.039% of schools in 2001, but the adoption 
rate rose to 1.7% in 2009. While these percentages remain small, the textbook authors’ view of 
history has been authorized and offi cially approved. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this textbook caused 
controversies in Japan, China and South Korea. The New History Textbook introduces many 
myths that were used to instill patriotism into the subjects of the Japanese Empire and it makes 
the history of the war short and ambiguous to diminish Japan’ s war responsibility and emphasize 
the nation’ s prewar history. Hence, the textbook authors’ view of history is criticized as “historical 
revisionism,” 31 and also as representing the revival of the prewar view of the Emperor’ s state his-
tory or “neo-nationalism.”
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However, the authors of this textbook are not necessarily anti-Asia, as they do raise the 
emancipatory aspects of Japan’ s role in the “Greater East Asia War” 32 in which Japan assisted 
Asian colonies in achieving independence from the West. However, their affi rmation of the war 
has caused protest in China and Korea, since it ignores the suffering these nations endured as 
colonies to the Japanese Empire. Straying further from an explicitly anti-Asia stance, the history 
textbook continues to express anti-U.S. sentiments. The proponents argue today’ s Japan faces 
a crisis of the loss of an “independent mind.” This sentiment adopts the tone of Yukichi Fuku-
zawa, an infl uential exponent of Japan’ s modernization in the earlier Meiji period. Arguing that 
the Japanese lost their self-confidence as a result of the U.S. postwar occupation policies and 
Japan’ s meek submission to them, they are anxious about Japan’ s future in the competitive glo-
balized world where protection by the U.S. is not as pronounced as during the Cold War. Their 
view of history is not simply a restoration to the prewar mythical past. They attempt to address 
the problems of the present world with solutions that differ from postwar democracy and paci-
fi sm. Indeed, according to them, under the Cold War structure, postwar democracy and pacifi sm–
ostensibly universal ideals–took the form of isolated particularisms. For example, the ideal of 
“peace” often took the form of demanding Japan’ s disengagement from global confl icts, rather 
than insisting on global peace. 33 Furthermore, the modernization theory that undergirded Ameri-
can policy in the immediate postwar years supposed that any particular “backward” country 
could progress to a universal modernity, which was posited as an abstract Western model; further, 
it assumed that particularities of national character could serve or hinder modernization. 34
This development model of nation-states has undergone a thorough critique in recent years 
on the basis of growing cross-border movements and transnational relations. On the one hand, 
when the nation-state system began to be shaken by the liberalization trends around the world in 
the 1990s, history studies began to take on the task of deconstructing nationalism by illuminating 
its imaginary nature and the oppressiveness of the nation-state. On the other hand, globalization 
began to threaten people’ s sense of stability, shake their pride in their nation’ s economic growth 
and prosperity, and unsettle their identity based on economic development. This instability has 
given rise to xenophobia and exclusivist nationalist movements. One consequence of these trends 
has been the emergence of so-called “neo-nationalism” that contains both the “cosmopolitan” 
tendencies of globalization and strong attitudes toward the anti-Japanese nationalism in the 
neighboring countries, which ironically has been the result of the growing cross-border exchang-
es of opinions. As an exponent of “neo-nationalism,” the Japanese Society for History Textbook 
Reform takes on the recent critique of the nation-state and reaffi rms the nation-state while at-
tempting to reconstruct Japanese nationalism. The attempt to intensify national integration is a 
reaction to the negative aspects of globalization. Moreover, the authors of the New History Text-
book and other nationalists profess that their aim is to reverse the “postwar historiography” and 
the “postwar regime.”
Indeed, in this author’ s view, postwar historiography in Japan was too inclined to positiv-
ism, and a fi xation on the “object” of study. As a result, the contents of history education became 
a dry, meaningless enumeration of the facts and rote learning to prepare students for grueling 
examinations. Students of this system cannot understand the real meaning of history and how it 
relates to them. To cope with this shortcoming in education, conservatives in particular invoke 
ethics and patriotism. Moreover, positivism cannot avoid the process by which neutral, objective 
studies are used to certify dominant power and thought. Postwar historiography has reconstructed 
national history on the basis of democracy and pacifi sm authorized by the Constitution and the 
presupposed nation-state system. Today, as constructivism attempts to replace positivism, the 
emphasis is on narrating memories from various points of view. It is inevitable that all historians 
have their own sets of values, which inform their perspectives and approaches to historical facts. 
History is a kind of personal story. This does not mean that everyone is free to discriminate or 
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harbor prejudices. Despite their ideas of “unbiased view of history” and “freedom,” the Japanese 
Society for History Textbook Reform cannot open up new horizons, as long as it remains fi xated 
on what it sees as a lack of Japanese self-esteem and self-awareness. Their own failure or refusal 
to recognize and come to terms with Japan’ s imperial past marks them as particularly lacking in 
historical self-awareness.
In the contemporary milieu in Japan, historical positivism plays a reactionary role, and con-
structivist versions of history can exploit this. For example, the New History Textbook reduced 
the Nanking Massacre to a quantitative issue, arguing that historical records were limited. Yuzo 
Mizoguchi points out accurately that this emphasis on the uncertainty of numbers transforms the 
existence of the fact itself into an uncertainty; it tries to make the historical fact appear as an “il-
lusion.” 35 This quasi-positivism based on selective “facts” has many biases in affi rming prewar 
Japan. 36
Some people have the idea that revealing the historical “truth” will lead to the resolution of 
the history problem, and this is often the hope of joint history research. However, revealing the 
“truth” also opens old wounds and intensifies conflicts over what constitutes “truth,” as dem-
onstrated by the history textbook controversies. In other words, dialogue about history has the 
potential to lead into a vicious cycle, or, the opposite, to reconciliation. For example, common 
educational materials on history for Japan, South Korea, and China, named History to Open the 
Future, published in 2005, attempted a transnational response to the history textbook controver-
sies and tried to create a shared historical recognition among the three nations. It is said that this 
dialogue was not necessarily attempting to compose a complete shared history at this point, but 
rather, it aspired to the more modest and attainable goal of discussing the differences of recogni-
tion among the three countries. 37 Following this strategy, Hiroshi Mitani suggests that historians 
should begin by sharing issues, rather than sharing conclusions. A step in the right direction is 
simply noticing where memories diverge, and the origins of this divergence. 38 If joint studies go 
well, reconciliation could–little by little–become a possibility. Whether we can share a vision of 
the history and reconcile depends on the people’ s will to pursue a common future.
6. Instead of a Conclusion
In this article, I have shown that the history problem is a present political issue. The issue is 
essentially about nationalistic clashes based on national histories, and it certainly requires a trans-
national resolution.
Prewar imperialism had divided Northeast Asia into empires and colonies, which intensifi ed 
the clash of nationalisms within the region, and, after Japan’ s defeat and decolonization of the 
other countries, the Cold War divided Northeast Asian countries into separate ideological camps 
and consolidated the nation-states of Japan and Korea (although Korea then was divided through 
a civil war). The lasting divisions of this region cast a shadow on today’ s situation in the form of 
a chasm of historical recognitions. Therefore, the resolution of the history problem, including the 
postwar compensation of victims and reconciliation, remains incomplete.
However, the controversies over history have shown the need for dialogue across borders. 
While it is true that dialogue can degenerate into a vicious circle of conflicting nationalisms, 
without it no reconciliation is possible. Even with government compensation of war victims, 
there is no certainty that compensation alone would heal the pain, or allow victims to fi nd a way 
to forgive. Overcoming the past might be, as Hannah Arendt said, impossible. 39 Nevertheless, 
we must consider how to work through the past to forge a path to the future. It might take a long 
time. We cannot categorically say that forgetting and oblivion is a sin by arguing that refl ecting 
upon history makes for a better future. As Nietzsche argues, forgetting is a virtue, since forgive-
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ness is not easy, and ressentiment is diffi cult to bear. 40 Nevertheless, it was the one-sided forget-
ting on the part of Japan that deteriorated Northeast Asian relations. Rather than the freedom to 
forget, perhaps it is the freedom to remember and take responsibility for the past that will liberate 
the future of Northeast Asia.
Refl ections on, and apologies for, past transgressions are a requisite for mutual trust and co-
existence in any region, and this is especially so for Northeast Asia, in which the movement of 
people and ideas is increasing. In this context, a resolution would not in itself be an end, but a 
way to begin a community built on the past.
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